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Abstract Studies of reality monitoring (RM) often
implicate medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in distinguish-
ing internal and external information, a region linked to
autism-related deficits in social and self-referential infor-
mation processing, executive function, and memory. This
study used two RM conditions (self-other; perceived-
imagined) to investigate RM and metamemory in adults
with autism. The autism group showed a deficit in RM,
which did not differ across source conditions, and both
groups exhibited a self-encoding benefit on recognition and
source memory. Metamemory for perceived-imagined
information, but not for self-other information, was sig-
nificantly lower in the autism group. Therefore, reality
monitoring and metamemory, sensitive to mPFC function,
appear impaired in autism, highlighting a difficulty in
remembering and monitoring internal and external details
of past events.
Keywords Autism  Episodic memory  Reality
monitoring  Metacognition  Metamemory
Introduction
Reality Monitoring and the mPFC
Episodic memory is the ability to recall details of a specific
event, such as temporal, visuo-spatial, and cognitive
information (Tulving 1985), while source memory specif-
ically refers to memory for the specific context in which an
event was experienced, facilitated by source monitoring
processes that evaluate memory characteristics and facili-
tate the source memory decision (Johnson et al. 1993). For
example, discriminating between internal and external
sources of information is referred to as ‘reality monitoring’
(Johnson et al. 1993), where internally-generated memories
are likely to contain more cognitive operations (e.g.
thoughts) than externally-generated memories, which in
turn are more likely to contain a greater number of per-
ceptual details (Johnson and Raye 1981). Source monitor-
ing processes can either be relatively automatic or more
strategic if, for example, two sources are quite similar in
nature.
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) has been widely implicated
in source memory, with evidence from lesion patients and
functional neuroimaging converging to support a role of
the PFC in the retrieval of a range of source contexts
(Dobbins et al. 2002; Duarte et al. 2005; Simons et al.
2002, 2005; Turner et al. 2008). However, the medial PFC
(mPFC) appears to be particularly sensitive to the disso-
ciation between internal and external sources, such as
perceived and imagined contexts, compared to other types
of source judgements (Brandt et al. 2014; Simons et al.
2006; Turner et al. 2008). Simons et al. (2008) investigated
the neural basis of memory for two different forms of
internal–external information: ‘self’- or ‘other’-generated
information and ‘perceived’ or ‘imagined’ information.
Interestingly, a relatively caudal mPFC region showed
significantly greater activity during discrimination of self-
other relative to perceived-imagined sources, with the latter
being associated with more rostral mPFC activity, high-
lighting functional specialization despite highly overlap-
ping activity associated with source retrieval.
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The region of the mPFC identified by Simons et al.
(2008) during the self-other discrimination consistently
exhibits activity during mentalizing (Gilbert et al. 2006), an
ability to consider different perspectives of ourselves and
others. The mPFC is thought to play a central role in rea-
soning about the self and others (Amodio and Frith 2006;
Buckner and Carroll 2007; Saxe et al. 2006), with evidence
supporting the relationship between mPFC activity and
distinguishing between objects processed in relation to
oneself or someone else (Kim and Johnson 2012). This
region has also been associated with memory for self-re-
lated information (Bergstrom et al. 2015; Zhu et al. 2012)
and with the benefit of self-referential encoding on source
memory (Leshikar and Duarte 2013). Conversely, the more
rostral region of the mPFC identified by Simons et al.
(2008), active during perceived-imagined reality monitor-
ing, is involved in multi-task coordination (Gilbert et al.
2006), in line with evidence that the rostral mPFC is sen-
sitive to switching between perceptual and cognitive
decisions (Gilbert et al. 2005). The functional distinction
within mPFC has been supported by Gilbert et al. (2007),
who observed caudal mPFC activity for mentalizing versus
non-mentalizing tasks and rostral mPFC activity during
perception versus imagining, leading to the suggestion that
the rostral mPFC is involved in monitoring internal and
external processes and attention switching. Such processes
also contribute to metamemory, monitoring the accuracy of
one’s memory, which has been linked with mPFC function
(Baird et al. 2013; Do Lam et al. 2012; see Fleming and
Dolan 2012 for a review), further supporting the impor-
tance of the mPFC for monitoring the internal and external
details of our memories.
Memory and Reality Monitoring in Autism
Spectrum Conditions
Autism spectrum conditions (henceforth, autism) are
associated with deficits in social and self-referential
information processing (Lombardo and Baron-Cohen 2011;
Frith 2001; Williams 2010) and much neurological evi-
dence points to the mPFC as an important site of dys-
function underpinning these characteristics (Ben Shalom
2009; Uddin 2011). Reduced mPFC activity has been
reported in individuals with autism during tasks requiring
mentalizing (Frith 2001; Murdaugh et al. 2012; White et al.
2014), with mPFC activity levels distinguishing less
between ‘self’ and ‘other’ during self-reference and self-
other judgement tasks than in typical individuals (Kennedy
and Courchesne 2008; Lombardo et al. 2009), suggesting
that representations of self- and other-related information
may not be as distinct.
Subtle memory deficits also exist in autism, largely
consisting of impaired episodic memory but intact
semantic memory (Boucher et al. 2012; Bowler et al.
2011). Impaired episodic memory in autism has been
suggested to result from mPFC dysfunction (Brezis 2015),
influenced by deficits in mentalizing (Baron-Cohen 1995)
and self-projection (Lind 2010; Lind et al. 2014), and some
evidence has suggested disproportionate deficits in moni-
toring and retrieving information regarding the self and
others. For instance, individuals with autism have impaired
recollection of social details relative to other perceptual
details (O’Shea et al. 2005) and reduced memory for
socially-encoded words (Brezis et al. 2013), as well as a
specific reduction in recollection of socially salient aspects
of scenes (Bruck et al. 2007). With regard to the ‘self’,
individuals with autism exhibit a reduced self-reference
effect in memory (Grisdale et al. 2014; Henderson et al.
2009; Lombardo et al. 2007), and episodic memory in
autism is less organised around self goals (Crane et al.
2009) and is less likely to be retrieved from a first-person
perspective (Lind and Bowler 2010; Lind et al. 2014).
However, episodic memory deficits involving non-social or
non-self oriented stimuli (e.g. Bowler et al. 2007, 2014;
Cooper et al. 2015) call into question whether memory
deficits in autism are solely characterised by mentalizing
and self-reference deficits. Investigating reality monitoring
in autism may thus provide valuable insights to resolve this
question.
However, findings from reality monitoring studies in
autism have been inconsistent and have largely focused on
self-other source memory alone. Some studies have
observed an impairment in the ability of individuals with
autism to recollect whether they or someone else per-
formed an action (Lind and Bowler 2009; Maras et al.
2013; Russell and Jarrold 1999), whereas other studies
have reported no difference in self-other reality monitoring
ability (Farrant et al. 1998; Grainger et al. 2014a; Hill and
Russell 2002; Zalla et al. 2010). Across most of these
studies, the number of participants and trials has been
small, limiting the power to uncover subtle differences. It is
interesting to note that the studies with the most trials
(Maras et al. 2013) and most participants (Lind and Bowler
2009) both observed deficits in self-other source memory.
However, these studies only examined one type of reality
monitoring and cannot determine whether a deficit in
processing information in relation to the self and others is
specifically responsible for the reality monitoring impair-
ment. Only one study has compared reality monitoring of
self-other and perceived-imagined sources in children with
autism, demonstrating a deficit across both conditions
(Hala et al. 2005). Hala et al. interpreted their results as
supporting an executive function framework, as a primary
mentalizing deficit would have predicted a disproportionate
reduction in self-other reality monitoring. Therefore, real-
ity monitoring differences in autism may not be solely
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driven by difficulties processing information about the self
and others, but may be also influenced by the monitoring
demands of the task.
The findings of Hala et al. could possibly be explained
by evidence of atypical mPFC activity during switching
between internal and external information in individuals
with autism (Gilbert et al. 2008). Furthermore, Gilbert et al.
(2009) compared an internal-external attention orienting
task and a mentalizing task, finding that individuals with
autism showed a distinct lack of neural functional spe-
cialization between the tasks, which could lead to gener-
alised rather than specific reality monitoring impairments.
Consistent with Hala et al.’s suggestion of monitoring and
attention switching influences on memory deficits in aut-
ism, recent evidence has demonstrated a strong relationship
between executive function and episodic memory in these
individuals (Goddard et al. 2014; Maister et al. 2013).
Additionally, the benefit of task support, such as providing
retrieval cues to support memory retrieval, on recall and
source memory in autism (Bowler et al. 2004; Maras et al.
2013) further highlights the influence of retrieval moni-
toring demands on memory deficits. Specifically, it is
believed that memory impairments in autism increase as
the complexity of the task demands increase (Minshew and
Goldstein 2001); suggesting that monitoring and attention
switching requirements during retrieval may influence
deficits seen in source recall and episodic memory. Direct
evidence for monitoring impairments during memory tasks
in autism comes from studies showing a reduction in
metacognition, specifically, impaired metamemory as
shown by less accurate ‘feeling of knowing’ judgements
(Grainger et al. 2014b; Wojcik et al. 2013) and a reduced
relationship between confidence and recognition memory
(Wilkinson et al. 2010). These findings suggest that a
deficit in autism in distinguishing between internal and
external sources of information in memory might also
extend to an impairment in monitoring the accuracy of
these source memory decisions, which has yet to be
investigated.
The aim of the current study is to investigate the pattern
of reality monitoring and metamemory impairments in
adults with autism, due to known mPFC dysfunction in this
population and the role of this region in reality monitoring
and metamemory, to compare the influence of self/social
information processing with monitoring and switching
between internal and external processes on memory in
autism. We adapted the task used by Simons et al. (2008) to
allow us to assess recognition memory as well as source
memory and memory confidence. The task tests partici-
pants’ ability to discriminate between self-other and per-
ceived-imagined sources in memory and to monitor the
accuracy of these source memory decisions. This task has
increased sensitivity relative to previous studies and
allowed us to assess each kind of source memory within the
same task, thereby controlling for any extraneous processes
that may have influenced the findings of previous studies
examining one type of source alone. The reality monitoring
task has been used in a number of previous studies,
exhibiting sensitivity to individual differences in typical
adults (Simons et al. 2006, 2008; Gilbert et al. 2010; Buda
et al. 2011), and in individuals with proneness to or risk of
developing psychosis (Lagioia et al. 2011; Simons et al.
2008). We aimed to test whether the ‘self’ has a reduced
benefit on recognition memory and source memory in
autism, and whether memory for self-other sources might
be disproportionately impaired in adults with autism due to
a reduction in mentalizing, or whether discriminating
between perceived and imagined sources might also be
impaired, reflecting a more general deficit in monitoring
information in memory. To this end, we also assessed
metacognitive sensitivity to test whether metamemory
deficits extend to source memory in autism.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four participants with a diagnosis of autism (13
females, 11 males) and twenty-four control participants (13
females, 11 males) took part. All participants were aged
between 18 and 45, and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and hearing. No participant in the control group had
a known current or historical diagnosis of any psychiatric,
neurological or developmental condition. Participants in
the autism group had a formal diagnosis of high-func-
tioning autism (N = 2) or Asperger Syndrome (N = 22)
according to DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association
2013) or ICD-10 criteria, and received their diagnosis
following specialist assessment by a qualified clinician. All
participants were administered the Autism Spectrum
Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), the short-form
Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (Arthur and Day
1994), the WAIS-III vocabulary test (Wechsler 1997), and
semantic and phonological fluency tests. The AQ is a 50
item questionnaire measuring self-reported autistic traits,
the short-form Raven’s Matrices assesses non-verbal
abstract reasoning to complete 12 items, yielding a maxi-
mum score of 12. The WAIS vocabulary test requires
participants to define a series of 33 words, with a maximum
score of 66, and the semantic and phonological verbal
fluency tests requires participants to generate as many
words as possible beginning with the letter ‘b’ or associ-
ated with the category ‘animals’, respectively, in 90 s. The
WAIS vocabulary test and Raven’s matrices were chosen
as short but reliable measures of verbal and non-verbal
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ability, and the verbal fluency test was administered as a
control because the memory task used involved generating
words. The groups were matched on age, years of educa-
tion, verbal and non-verbal ability, and phonological and
semantic fluency (all p[ .33; see Table 1), and the autism
group scored significantly higher on the AQ than the
control group (t(46) = 12.91, p\ .001).
Participants with autism were recruited from a partici-
pant database held by the Cambridge Laboratory for
Research into Autism, and the Cambridge Autism Research
Centre’s participant database. Control participants were
recruited via an existing participant database maintained by
the Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute
(BCNI), Cambridge University, as well as via social media
adverts. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from
the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee.
Participants gave written informed consent prior to taking
part and were paid a standard honorarium for their time.
Design and Procedure
The computer-based reality monitoring task included 144
study phase trials and 216 test phase trials (including the
studied stimuli and 72 new stimuli) divided into 6 study-
test blocks. The stimuli consisted of common word pairs
(e.g. ‘‘Batman and Robin’’), collated from previous studies
(Simons et al. 2006, 2008; Buda et al. 2011) that exten-
sively piloted the word-pairs to ensure their familiarity (see
‘‘Appendix’’). The word-pairs were studied in one of four
encoding conditions: ‘self-perceived (SP)’, ‘self-imagined’
(SI), ‘experimenter-perceived’ (EP), and ‘experimenter-
imagined’ (EI), with 36 word-pairs per condition. For ‘self’
word-pairs, participants were instructed to read the word-
pair out loud and, for ‘experimenter’ word-pairs, they were
informed that the experimenter would read the word-pair
out loud. ‘Perceived’ trials were those in which both words
in the word-pair were shown on the screen and ‘imagined’
word-pairs were trials in which just the first word and the
first letter of the second word were displayed (e.g. ‘‘Bat-
man and R____’’) and the participant or experimenter had
to imagine the second word in the pair before saying the
word-pair aloud (see Fig. 1). If the participant struggled to
complete the word-pair in an ‘imagine’ trial then they were
encouraged to generate and speak aloud a suitable guess.
Each test phase was completed immediately after
studying all 24 word-pairs in the block. Participants were
tested on the first word from each of the studied word-pairs
or the first word from a new, unstudied, word-pair. For half
of all 36 words tested per block, they were tested on their
memory for whether the corresponding word-pair had been
said by ‘self’ or the ‘researcher’ during the study phase or
if the word was new (‘Self/Experimenter’ or ‘SE’ condi-
tion), and, for the other half, if the second word of the
word-pair had been ‘seen’ or ‘imagined’ during the study
phase or if the word was new (‘Perceived/Imagined’ or ‘PI’
condition) (see Fig. 2). Therefore, of all 144 studied words,
72 were tested in the SE condition and 72 were tested in the
PI condition, with each test condition including 18 word-
pairs from each of the four encoding conditions. Both
accuracy and time taken to respond were measured. For
each word, participants indicated their confidence on a
continuous scale of ‘low’ to ‘high’. Confidence was
determined by the duration the participant held down their
response key to move a bar on the screen from low to high
(range 0–1000 ms). Participants were instructed to think
about how confident they were in each of their responses
Table 1 Demographic information and psychometric test scores
within each group: mean (std)
Autism (N = 24) Control (N = 24)
Age 31.38 (7.28) 30.46 (6.95)
Years of education 15.50 (2.13) 15.96 (2.14)
AQ 37.38 (7.03) 14.54 (5.07)
Raven’s percentilea 75.42 (27.66) 70.83 (29.25)
WAIS vocabularyb 13.29 (2.37) 13.13 (2.72)
Phonological fluency 26.58 (7.79) 27.67 (5.05)
Semantic fluency 35.83 (9.61) 38.33 (8.17)
a Raven’s score are standardised
b WAIS scores are standardised
Fig. 1 An example of trials in the SELF-PERCEIVED study
condition (a) and the RESEARCHER-IMAGINED study condition
(b)
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and to use the whole confidence range accordingly
throughout the task. The order of the SE and PI test con-
ditions was counterbalanced across the 6 blocks. Presen-
tation of the word pairs as old or new was counterbalanced,
as was studying the word-pairs in each of the four study
conditions and testing the word-pairs in either the SE or PI
condition. Trials were pseudorandomised so that no more
than three trials in a row were from the same condition for
both study and test phases. Participants were given an
instruction sheet and completed a practice task before
starting the experiment.
After the reality monitoring task, participants completed
a debriefing questionnaire and the AQ. Participants then
completed the Raven’s matrices followed by the verbal
fluency tasks and the WAIS vocabulary sub-test. The tasks
were completed in this order for every participant and the
total testing session lasted up to 1  hours.
Data Analysis
All analyses were conducted using two-tailed tests at a
standard alpha level of .05. Effect sizes are reported using
eta-squared (g2) values for analyses of variance (ANO-
VAs) and Cohen’s d for t tests. First, overall recognition
memory during both the SE and PI test conditions was
assessed, and it was then tested whether recognition
memory was affected by encoding condition and if this
differed between groups. Analyses of source memory used
a conditional measure of source accuracy, defined as the
proportion of correct source responses for word-pairs cor-
rectly recognised. Analyses assessed overall source mem-
ory in the SE and PI test conditions, accuracy for each
source within the SE and PI test conditions (S vs E; P vs I,
respectively), and then to see how source memory accuracy
in the SE and PI test conditions is affected by encoding
Fig. 2 An example of a trial in
the PERCEIVED/IMAGINED
test condition (a) and an
example of a trial in the SELF/
EXPERIMENTER test
condition (b)
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condition (P vs I; S vs E, respectively). Analyses then
focused on source metamemory, defined as the trial-by-trial
correlation between source memory accuracy (0, 1) and
confidence (0–1000). This measure of metamemory was
chosen due to the continuous nature of the confidence
response and to maximise sensitivity to detect subtle dif-
ferences in metacognition over and above discrete ratings.
Results
Recognition
To assess recognition memory accuracy, d’ was calculated
for both the SE and PI test conditions. Recognition ‘hits’
were defined as the percentage of studied words correctly
identified as old regardless of the source the participant
chose, and false alarms (FAs) were defined as the propor-
tion of new items misattributed to one of the two sources.
A 2 group (autism, control) 9 2 test condition (SE, PI)
ANOVA on recognition d’ revealed no main effects or
interaction between factors (Fs\ .2, ps[ .7, g2\ .01),
demonstrating that recognition d’ did not differ between
the autism (mean = 2.89, std = 0.53) and control
(mean = 2.85, std = 0.62) groups. The proportion of
studied words correctly recognised was high in both the SE
(autism: mean = 0.87, std = 0.08; control: mean = 0.88,
std = 0.06) and PI (autism: mean = 0.87, std = 0.09;
control: mean = 0.89, std = 0.06) test conditions. T tests
performed on confidence ratings and time taken to cor-
rectly reject new words also showed no difference between
the groups (ts\ 1, ps[ .5, ds\ 0.17). Therefore, recog-
nition memory of the autism and control groups was very
similar overall.
Effect of Encoding Condition on Recognition
To investigate the effect of encoding condition on subse-
quent recognition memory, an ANOVA was conducted on
recognition of words studied in each of the four encoding
conditions using a 2 (S, E) 9 2 (P, I) 9 2 (autism group,
control group) analysis (see Table 2 for mean recognition
accuracy by encoding condition). A self-reference effect
was observed as the proportion of recognised words was
significantly higher for previously self-spoken items than
for experimenter items, F(1,46) = 53.65, p\ .001,
g2 = .28, and this effect did not differ between the groups
(F\ .2, p[ .7, g2\ .01). A significant generation effect, a
benefit of imagining items on later recognition, was also
observed, F(1,46) = 97.29, p\ .001, g2 = .30, which did
not differ between the groups (F\ .1, p[ .8, g2\ .01).
There was no significant interaction between SE and PI
(F = 2.3, p = .13, g2 = .01), which did not vary by group
(F = 0.0, p[ .9, g2\ .01). Therefore, recognition mem-
ory of the autism and control groups was similarly affected
by encoding condition.
Source Memory
To first compare whether source memory differed between
groups and whether this varied according to test condition,
a 2 group (autism, control) 9 2 test condition (SE, PI)
ANOVA was conducted. In this case, SE and PI source
accuracy reflects how well participants could distinguish
self and experimenter sources and perceived and imagined
sources, respectively. Source accuracy was significantly
higher in the SE condition than in the PI condition,
F(1,46) = 29.71, p\ .001, g2 = .39, an effect which did
not differ between groups (F\ .2, p[ .7, g2\ .01).
However, the autism group were found to have signifi-
cantly lower source memory accuracy than the control
group, F(1,46) = 4.43, p = .04, g2 = .09 (see Fig. 3). The
same ANOVA was repeated using confidence and RT for
source memory responses. Participants were more confi-
dent, F(1,46) = 13.66, p\ .001, g2 = .22, and faster,
F(1,46) = 214.42, p\ .001, g2 = .82, for their SE source
decisions than PI source decisions. Confidence did not
significantly differ between the autism (mean = 732,
std = 115) and control (mean = 779, std = 133) groups
Table 2 d’ the proportion of correctly recognised words that were
studied in each of the four encoding conditions (self-perceived, self-
imagined, experimenter-perceived, experimenter-imagined): mean
(std)
SP SI EP EI
Control 0.90 (0.09) 0.97 (0.03) 0.78 (0.09) 0.89 (0.09)
Autism 0.88 (0.10) 0.95 (0.06) 0.77 (0.13) 0.88 (0.13)
Fig. 3 Mean proportion of recognised words for which the correct
source was identified for the autism and control groups in the self-
experimenter (SE) and perceived-imagined (PI) test conditions. Error
bars SEM
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(F = 1.7, p = .20, g2\ .04), which did not vary between
test conditions (F = 1.7, p = .19, g2\ .04). Similarly, RT
did not differ between the autism (mean = 1.83 s,
std = 0.29) and control (mean = 1.79 s, std = 0.25)
groups (F\ .5, p[ .5, g2\ .01), which did not vary
between test conditions (F = 1.2, p[ .2, g2\ .03).
Therefore, while overall source memory accuracy was
reduced in the autism group, confidence and RT for source
memory decisions did not differ between the groups.
Memory for Individual Sources
To investigate whether accuracy for indentifying individual
sources (e.g. different proportions of correct source
responses for self and experimenter words pairs) differed
between groups, 2 ANOVAs were conducted, one in each
test condition. A 2 (group: autism, control) 9 2 (source: S,
E) ANOVA in the SE condition revealed that participants
were significantly more likely to correctly identify the
source of experimenter-spoken word-pairs than self-spoken
word-pairs, F(1,40) = 54.63, p\ .001, g2 = .54, an effect
which did not significantly differ between groups (F\ 1.8,
p = .19, g2\ .04). In a second 2 (group: autism, con-
trol) 9 2 (source: P, I) ANOVA in the PI condition, neither
the main effects of source nor the interaction between
source and group were significant (Fs\ 1, ps[ .3,
g2\ .02) (see Table 3 for mean source accuracy values).
Effect of Encoding Condition on Source Memory
To investigate how source memory accuracy was affected
by encoding condition, two ANOVAs were conducted, one
within each test condition. The first 2 (group: autism,
control) 9 2 (encoding condition: P, I) ANOVA for SE
source accuracy revealed that SE source memory was
significantly higher for word-pairs that had been imagined
at encoding as opposed to perceived, F(1,46) = 47.48,
p\ .001, g2 = .51, an effect that did not differ between
groups (F\ 1.3, p[ .27, g2\ .03). For the PI test con-
dition, a 2 (group: autism, control) 9 2 (encoding condi-
tion: S, E) ANOVA revealed that later PI source memory
was significantly higher for previously self-spoken items as
opposed word pairs read by the researcher, F(1,46) =
16.34, p\ .001, g2 = .26, an effect which also did not
differ between the groups (F\ .5, p[ .5, g2\ .01) (see
Table 3 for mean source accuracy values). Therefore, the
pattern of source memory accuracy was similar between
groups when looking at source memory across the various
test and encoding conditions, also showing self-reference
and generation effects.
Metamemory
To measure metamemory, a within-subject correlation
coefficient, using Fisher’s r to z transformation, was cal-
culated for each participant between trial-by-trial source
memory accuracy and confidence. A 2 (group) 9 2 (test
condition: SE, PI) ANOVA on metamemory scores (see
Fig. 4) revealed no difference between the SE and PI
conditions (F\ .1, p[ .7, g2\ .01), and no overall dif-
ference between the 2 groups (F\ 1.2, p[ .29, g2\ .03).
However, a significant interaction between group and
condition, F(1,46) = 5.33, p = .03, g2 = .10, was due to
the autism group showing significantly lower metamemory
in the PI condition compared to the control group,
t(46) = 2.59, p = .01, d = 0.75, but there was no differ-
ence between the groups for metamemory in the SE
condition (t\ 1, p[ .39, d\ .24). Nonetheless, metacog-
nitive sensitivity in both conditions in both groups was
greater than 0 (ts[ 7.8, ps\ .001, ds[ 1.6).
To verify that the metamemory differences were not due
to other aspects of performance that might influence the
within-subject correlations (e.g. source memory accuracy,
mean confidence, confidence variability), 3 low source
memory performers and 3 high source memory performers
from the autism and control groups respectively were
removed to create 2 groups (each N = 21) that were
matched on source memory accuracy (p[ .53) and
remained matched on mean confidence (p[ .39),
Table 3 Source accuracy (proportion correct) for items encoded as
self-spoken (S), experimenter-spoken (E), perceived (P), and imag-
ined (I) during both the SE and PI test conditions: mean (std)
Control Autism
SE PI SE PI
S 0.84 (0.09) 0.86 (0.08) 0.79 (0.13) 0.81 (0.10)
E 0.95 (0.05) 0.79 (0.08) 0.95 (0.06) 0.76 (0.14)
P 0.84 (0.10) 0.82 (0.11) 0.82 (0.09) 0.78 (0.12)
I 0.94 (0.05) 0.84 (0.08) 0.90 (0.07) 0.79 (0.14)
Fig. 4 Mean within-subject correlation between confidence and
accuracy as a measure of metacognitive sensitivity for source
memory. Error bars SEM
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variability of confidence responses (p[ .26), and all
demographic variables (ps[ .23) (see Grainger et al.
2014b for a similar approach). Repeating the ANOVA on
metamemory revealed the same selective significant PI
metamemory deficit in the autism group, F(1,40) = 4.33,
p = .04, g2 = .09; t(40) = 2.73, p = .01, d = 0.79, and
no difference in SE metamemory (t\ 1, p[ .5, d\ 0.16)
compared to the control group. Therefore, a deficit in PI
metamemory in the autism group seems to be somewhat
dissociable from their overall source memory deficit, as
further suggested by a lack of correlation between these
two scores (r = .23, p = .29).
Discussion
The current study tested reality monitoring in adults with
autism, with the aim of resolving previous inconsistent
findings by directly contrasting two types of reality moni-
toring which are considered to differ with regard to
underlying mentalizing processes within the same task. We
also assessed the effect of self-referential processing on
both recognition and source memory in autism, to test
whether difficulties processing information in relation to
the self may contribute to memory impairments in autism.
Lastly, we assessed metamemory in autism to determine
whether previously documented metamemory impairments
extend to source memory and, thus, whether individuals
with autism have a difficulty differentiating and monitoring
internal and external details of their memories. Both groups
exhibited an equal benefit of self-referential processing and
imagining on later recognition relative to other encoding
conditions. However, the autism group were impaired at
remembering the source of studied word-pairs, an effect
which did not differ according to whether self-other or
perceived-imagined source discriminations were tested.
Furthermore, the pattern of source responses did not differ
between the groups and, as for recognition, both groups
showed a benefit of self-referential processing and gener-
ation on subsequent source memory. Finally, an analysis of
metamemory revealed that the autism group exhibited
intact metamemory for self-other source discriminations
but reduced metamemory for perceived-imagined source
discriminations, indicating that the ability to monitor the
accuracy of perceptual and cognitive details of source
memory may be impaired in autism.
The finding that self-related encoding processes bene-
fitted both subsequent recognition and source memory in
autism is inconsistent with the view that autism is
accompanied by atypical self-referential processes (Lom-
bardo and Baron-Cohen 2011). Rather, it suggests that
individuals with autism are able to use the self as an
effective organisational encoding strategy, an aspect of
memory that has been thought to be impaired (Crane et al.
2009). A reduced effect of the self on memory has not been
demonstrated consistently in autism, with some studies
reporting a reduced benefit of the self on subsequent
memory in autism (Henderson et al. 2009; Lombardo et al.
2007) and others indicating an intact benefit of self-related
encoding (Grainger et al. 2014a; Lind and Bowler 2009;
Williams and Happe´ 2009). Therefore, one interpretation
of the results from the current study is that self-related
encoding can enhance subsequent memory in autism to the
same degree as in typical controls. Alternatively, an
account that may be more likely to explain the current
findings involves the possibility of a distinction between
the ‘psychological’ self and the ‘physical’ self in autism,
with the former being impaired and the latter intact (Uddin
2011). The aforementioned studies reporting a reduced
influence of the self have primarily used conceptual
encoding tasks (such as ‘‘does this adjective describe
you?’’), whereas studies observing a benefit of the self on
memory, including the current study, have used action-
based encoding tasks (such as ‘‘say this word out loud’’). A
dissociation between ‘self-reference’ and ‘self-enactment’
has been proposed to explain these findings (Lind 2010;
Williams 2010). Future research should, therefore, com-
pare source memory for self-oriented conceptual and
action-based contexts to directly test the influence of the
self on episodic memory in autism.
However, even if conceptual self- processing were dis-
proportionately impaired in autism, it would seem unlikely
to be able to fully account for the reality monitoring
impairment found in the current study, where source
memory for word-pairs was reduced to a similar degree
regardless of whether the source discrimination was self-
other or perceived-imagined. The source memory deficit
observed here may help to resolve previous inconsistent
reality monitoring findings in autism (e.g. Lind and Bowler
2009, Grainger et al. 2014a), confirming that reality mon-
itoring impairments do exist, even though the effect may
evident only in particularly sensitive tasks. This heteroge-
neous reality memory impairment also has another impli-
cation, namely that mentalizing, considered particularly
important for the discrimination of self-other information
(Simons et al. 2008), may not fully account for the reality
monitoring deficit found in autism. This interpretation is
supported by evidence from Lind and Bowler (2009) who,
like in the current study, observed a self-other reality
monitoring deficit in autism in the presence of a self-en-
actment effect and, interestingly, reality monitoring ability
in autism did not relate to performance on a separate
mentalizing task, suggesting a dissociation between reality
monitoring and mentalizing processes in autism. Further
evidence comes from other studies of source memory and
recollection reporting an impairment in autism that have
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not involved reality monitoring conditions, instead focus-
ing on retrieval of spatial, temporal, and visual context
(Bowler et al. 2004, 2014; Massand and Bowler 2013),
although it is worth noting that evidence of a deficit in
visual-spatial source memory in autism has not always
been observed consistently (Bowler et al. 2015; Souchay
et al. 2013). Nonetheless, the deficits in source memory
reported here are consistent with findings from other types
of tasks measuring the ability of individuals with autism to
recollect context information, such as a reduction in ‘re-
member’ responses when recognising words or objects
(Bowler et al. 2007; Cooper et al. 2015; Meyer et al. 2014)
and reduced specificity of autobiographical memory (Lind
and Bowler 2010; Maister et al. 2013), further illustrating
memory deficits that appear to extend beyond self-refer-
ential and social processes.
An overall source memory impairment could perhaps
suggest generalised PFC dysfunction in autism, although it
is important to note that the link between a reality moni-
toring deficit and PFC dysfunction in autism can only be
indirectly speculated upon based on the current study.
However, this possibility seems reasonably likely consid-
ering the importance of the PFC in source memory
(Mitchell and Johnson 2009), with functional specialization
within this area of the brain proposed to reflect several
distinct processes that contribute to source memory
retrieval (Dobbins et al. 2002; Fletcher and Henson 2001).
Another possibility, which has been more widely advo-
cated in recent years, is that autism is characterised by
reduced long-range connectivity between prefrontal and
posterior regions (Courchesne and Pierce 2005; Just et al.
2012) which would indirectly impair frontal functions,
such as monitoring and integrating information in memory.
Due to the importance of the PFC for source memory, and
episodic memory in general, future research should aim to
study the PFC and its connectivity to other regions of the
episodic memory network (see Mitchell and Johnson 2009)
in autism to establish the neural correlates of impaired
source memory and to investigate the specific cognitive
processes, possibly supported by the PFC, that might
contribute to source memory impairments. Although, it
cannot be directly inferred that the same brain regions or
networks will underpin the same memory functions in
typical individuals and individuals with autism.
The present finding of impaired metamemory in the PI test
condition in autism also fits well with a source memory def-
icit, further supporting the notion of a difficulty monitoring
information within memory. This is the first study to
demonstrate impaired metamemory for source information in
autism, extending previous findings of atypical feeling-of-
knowing (FOK) judgements in autism (Grainger et al. 2014b;
Wojcik et al. 2013). Although both retrospective confidence
judgements and prospective FOK judgements measure
metamemory, evidence suggests they may be functionally
and neurally dissociable (Fleming and Dolan 2012). There-
fore, the observation that adults with autism also exhibit ret-
rospective metamemory deficits for source memory
judgements extends our knowledge concerning metacogni-
tive awareness in this population. It is important to note,
however, that the autism group only exhibited impaired
metamemory in the PI condition and not the SE condition, a
distinction that was not predicted. One reason for this dif-
ference may be the relative difficulty of the source discrimi-
nations; both groups found the SE sources easier to identify
than the PI sources, meaning that evidence for SE source
memory decisions was likely to be easier to monitor. Once
source details become more overlapping and harder to dif-
ferentiate as might be the case for PI sources, the ability of
individuals with autism to monitor the accuracy of their
memories might reduce. Alternatively, preserved metamem-
ory in the self-other condition may have been attributable to
intact action-monitoring, as previously discussed, whereas
the perceived-imagined source condition predominantly
relied on consideration of perceptual and cognitive details
independent of agency. It is therefore important for future
studies to test metamemory in autismwithin different types of
context, similarity, and difficulty, for example, to clarify
exactly when metamemory is impaired in autism.
The confidence-based metamemory deficits observed
here are, however, in line with findings from an autobio-
graphical memory study in autism which found that par-
ticipants with autism rated their own memories as less
salient and coherent (Lind et al. 2014), possibly suggesting
a reduction in the subjective quality of episodic memory,
with difficulty visualizing and monitoring memory details.
In support of this proposal, there is evidence that
metamemory deficits in autism may be characterised by
underconfidence in correct memories (Grainger et al.
2014b). Conversely, there was no overall reduction in
confidence for source memory in the current study, perhaps
suggesting that monitoring and accessing information dur-
ing retrieval might be impaired rather than the quality of the
memory once retrieved. The source monitoring framework
assumes that recollection is a graded process (Mitchell and
Johnson 2009); therefore, research in autism would benefit
from investigating both access to and the quality of episodic
memories in autism rather than using traditional ‘all-or-
none’ methods such as a binary choice between two sources
or ‘remember’ versus ‘know’ judgements. Future studies
could explicitly test the quality of recollected information in
autism by adapting source memory tasks to assess ‘partial’
source memory (e.g. Dodson et al. 1998), or the ‘precision’
with which memories are recollected (Harlow and Yoneli-
nas 2014). Future research should also focus on developing
specific teaching methods and learning strategies to ame-
liorate the source memory and monitoring deficits provided
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here, possibly via the use of structured retrieval cues and
minimising memory load.
In conclusion, this study investigated reality monitoring
for two different types of source discrimination, self-other and
perceived-imagined, in adults with autism. The autism group
exhibited a reduction in reality monitoring for both types of
source discrimination, which was accompanied by a deficit in
metamemory when evaluating visual-perceptual and cogni-
tive sources. These results imply that impaired monitoring
and attention switching may play a role in source memory
deficits in autism. Due to the link between reality monitoring,
source memory, and the prefrontal cortex in the typical
population, one possibility is that the source andmetamemory
deficits in autism could arise due to prefrontal dysfunction or
reduced prefrontal-posterior connectivity. However, further
research would be needed to directly test this association,
which, alongside qualitative aspects of recollection, is an
important area of episodic memory to investigate in autism.
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Appendix
Batman and Robin home and away cup and saucer before and after
doom and gloom rest and relaxation sage and onion ladies and gentlemen
wear and tear mum and dad map and compass Slug and Lettuce
live and learn run and hide Winnie and Pooh ketchup and mustard
holly and ivy bright and early shoes and socks dustpan and brush
to and fro Baskin and Robbins Mario and Luigi bangers and mash
Alliance and Leicester cuts and bruises pestle and mortar Rosie and Jim
wine and dine plus and minus arts and crafts Sonny and Cher
Jekyll and Hyde duck and cover fast and furious north and south
Oxford and Cambridge father and mother alpha and beta Pride and Prejudice
Mickey and Minnie wait and see toss and turn dazed and confused
winners and losers Tarzan and Jane bacon and eggs Posh and Becks
on and off Fred and Ginger day and night give and take
crime and punishment thrills and spills bits and pieces Hansel and Gretel
tweedledum and tweedledee hot and cold Jack and Jill Holmes and Watson
foot and mouth master and commander slip and slide ping and pong
life and death lost and found doctors and nurses stocks and shares
brother and sister heart and soul twist and shout law and order
loud and clear health and safety William and Kate Sylvester and Tweety
Aladdin and Jasmine Romeo and Juliet Puss and Boots cigarettes and alcohol
rhubarb and custard boys and girls birds and bees nook and cranny
bubble and squeak Will and Grace Wallace and Gromit Shrek and Donkey
town and gown Dumb and Dumber one and only stars and stripes
east and west rum and coke push and pull hope and glory
tried and tested park and ride sticks and stones yin and yang
Anthony and Cleopatra Gonville and Caius safe and sound odds and ends
rhyme and reason rock and roll Spongebob and Squarepants look and listen
cowboys and indians cash and carry apples and pears guys and dolls
skin and bone this and that Barbie and Ken nuts and bolts
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